Transaction Costs and Profitability in UK Manufacturing by Dietrich, M.
This is a repository copy of Transaction Costs and Profitability in UK Manufacturing.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/10007/
Monograph:
Dietrich, M. (2009) Transaction Costs and Profitability in UK Manufacturing. Working 
Paper. Department of Economics, University of Sheffield ISSN 1749-8368 
Sheffield Economic Research Paper Series 2009011
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright 
exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy 
solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The 
publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White 
Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, 
users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher’s website. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
  
 
 
Sheffield Economic Research Paper Series 
 
SERP Number: 2009011 
 
 
ISSN 1749-8368 
 
 
 
 
Michael Dietrich 
 
 
Transaction Costs and Profitability in UK Manufacturing 
 
 
June 2009 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
University of Sheffield 
9 Mappin Street 
Sheffield 
S1 4DT  
United Kingdom 
www.shef.ac.uk/economics 
 
 Abstract: 
 
This paper explores the impact of transaction costs on performance at firm and 
industry levels using a sample of 7350 UK manufacturing firms. This is achieved by 
estimating a profit function with estimated transaction costs as a right hand side 
variable. The discussion has two specific objectives. (1) To show how firm and 
average industry transaction costs can be estimated using a stochastic frontier method. 
(2) To examine a central claim of transaction cost theory that links these costs to 
performance. In addition the different impacts of static and dynamic transaction costs 
are emphasised, with the different impacts being respectively negative and positive on 
profitability. Broadly speaking it is shown that such costs do impact on performance 
in a way consistent with both static and dynamic costs, in different industries, and that 
the impacts hold after a series of robustness checks. In addition it is shown that the 
impacts can depend on monopoly power, firm scale, and firm growth. 
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 Introduction 
A long tradition exists in industrial organisation (IO) literature that links firm 
structure and development to transaction cost (TC) factors, for instance: vertical 
integration (Williamson 1971, 1975; Lieberman 1991), diversification (Williamson 
1975, 1981; Teece 1980, 1982), and multinational development (Williamson 1985; 
Buckley and Casson 1976; McManus 1972; Hennart 1982). It is pertinent to recognise 
that these firm structure characteristics are, in other contexts, determinants of market 
structure. Analysing the possible linkages between such market structure 
characteristics and profitability has an even longer IO tradition, based on an SCP 
logic, starting with Bain (1951, 1956). In terms of empirical work this latter tradition 
involves estimating profit functions with various right hand side market structure 
variables. It follows that in principle these two traditions might be linked: TCs might 
be viewed as part of a market’s fundamental demand-supply characteristics, along 
with for example technology and elasticity factors, that (in the long-run) influence 
market structure and hence conduct and performance. This suggests a standard profit 
function might be estimated with TCs on the right hand side. 
 
This paper explores this linkage in the context of UK manufacturing firm and industry 
data. An initial issue that perhaps explains why a TC based profit equation has not 
apparently been attempted, is that TCs are rarely measured. Buckley and Chapman 
(1997), for example, claim that TC thinking is often formulated in a manner that 
places it outside the domain of quantification. For this apparent reason they are 
usually asserted, proxied or imputed. In core IO discussion two characteristic ways 
seem to exist that adds an empirical perspective to TC discussion. First, examples or 
cases are provided. In this tradition Williamson (1985) analyses the (non)occurrence 
of vertical integration in the context of Kodak. More recently the General Motors 
integration with Fisher Body in 1926 has been the subject of considerable discussion 
(for example Klein 2000; Coase 2000; Freeland 2000). Examples are useful for 
illustrative purposes but rarely is there an attempt to refute their relevance. This is one 
part of Coase’s (2000, 2006) criticisms of a “hold-up” (i.e. TC) explanation of the 
General Motors case. The second core IO empirical tradition is econometric. Here 
investigation is based on identification of key variables suggested by TC theory, e.g. 
asset specificity and uncertainty. For example Monteverde and Teece (1982) and 
Lieberman (1991) in their analyses of vertical integration and Armour and Teece 
(1978) and Steer and Cable (1978) on the “M” form hypothesis use proxy or imputed 
variables. This second line of approach is clearly informative. But in a strict sense it 
can only generate conclusions that suggest consistency between TC theory and 
evidence. In principle other explanations might exist that are consistent with the 
econometric results. 
 
Outside the core IO literature there is relevant work undertaken in the area of 
agricultural economics. Three particular traditions appear to exist here. First, Hobbs 
(1997) has used questionnaire based surveys to assess the level and significance of 
TCs. In the current context the opportunity costs of this approach is prohibitive if the 
intention is to duplicate the coverage used here involving 7350 firms. The second 
agricultural economics empirical TC tradition involves analysis of international and 
local price bands (for example De Janvry et al, 1991). While this approach yields 
useful results in the analysis of agriculture, extension of the method beyond this 
industry would seem to be problematic. Finally, Key et al (2000) estimate production 
and consumption functions and use results to analyse the impact of TCs. This latter 
approach is developed in the current study and extended beyond agricultural 
economics.  
 
Given this background it is now possible to specify the objectives of this paper: 
1. To estimate firm and average industry TCs in a way that is not restricted to 
particular industries. 
2. To examine a central claim of TC theory that links TCs to performance 
(profitability) i.e. estimate profit equations with firm and industry TCs as right hand 
side variables. 
 
An important introductory issue involves defining TCs. Usually these are compared to 
friction in the physical sciences: the costs of search, negotiation and policing involved 
with the production and exchange of goods and services (Arrow 1974). More 
specifically (from Williamson, 1985) TCs are: 
1. “Maladaption” costs with inefficient transactions. 
2. “Haggling” and “bonding” costs. 
3. Set-up and running costs of organisations.  
How this definition is rendered operational is considered below. 
 
There are two distinct approaches or methodologies adopted by TC writers. First there 
is what is often called static TCs, as exemplified in the writing of Williamson (1985, 
1991) as well as much of the earlier cited TC literature. Here the reasoning is 
equilibrium based (Dietrich 1994, 2007) with increases in TCs reducing firm 
profitability. It follows that static TC theory views profit oriented decision makers as 
having an incentive to minimise TCs. The second approach is often labelled dynamic 
TC analysis (e.g. Langlois 1992; Langlois and Robertson 1995). This is based on 
process, or neo-Austrian, reasoning. Management capacity and organisational slack is 
required to plan and enact firm change. It follows that increasing TCs increases firm 
profit opportunity. But this positive effect of TCs on profitability may be bounded, i.e. 
a “Penrose effect” (after Penrose’s 1959 analysis of firm growth) may apply with 
dynamic diminishing returns to management. This possibility is examined later with a 
quadratic form on the TC explanatory variable. In addition later discussion will 
attempt to identify the relevance of these two distinct TC approaches. 
 
An important issue exists with empirical development of these abstract ideas. There is 
often a comparison (sometimes implicit) with perfect markets for which TCs are zero. 
In practice TCs for a firm can never be zero as there is always a need for some 
minimum level of management/organisation costs and some slack. This minimum 
requirement defines a lower bound to firm TCs. Using standard TC reasoning, this 
lower bound is likely to be industry specific and dependent on factors such as 
necessary asset specificity and uncertainty. If firm TCs are less than this lower bound 
a firm is not viable. The linkages (either positive or negative) between TCs and firm 
profitability apply above this lower bound. Among other things this suggests an 
appropriate estimating technique that recognises this bound. 
 
The rest of the discussion is organised as follows. In the next section it is shown how 
stochastic frontier analysis can be used to estimate firms TCs, where these are viewed 
as management and slack above a necessary industry specific minimum bound. 
Following this the discussion turns to the data and empirical method that is used in 
this study. The next section reports results for profitability equations that include 
industry and firm TCs as right hand side variables. Following discussion of the first 
set of results, further analysis is undertaken to control for non-identifiable fixed 
effects on profitability, the possible endogeneity of TCs and possible spurious 
correlation via left hand side and right hand side denominators. Finally the paper ends 
with general discussion and a conclusion. 
 
Measuring firm transaction costs 
A measure of transaction costs for firm i (TCi) is required, and to control for firm size 
this is expressed as a proportion of firm revenue (TCi/Ri) i.e. we need to measure 
transaction cost intensities analogous to that used in the analysis of advertising. To 
measure TCs in this way we can initially define a trans-log stochastic frontier model 
with inputs labour (L) and capital (K) that generate firm revenue (R) 
 lnRi = a0 + a1lnLi + a2lnKi + a3(lnLi)
2
 + a4(lnKi)
2
 + a5lnLilnKi + vi – ui [1] 
 
Any stochastic frontier model such as [1] is based on an asymmetric total residual  
(vi – ui) (Kumbhaker and Lovell, 2000). The conventional residuals are vi → N(0, σ). 
The ui measure the (in)efficiency of firm i, i.e. the distance from the productive 
frontier. In terms of TC language this distance from the frontier is above necessary 
management and “maladaption” costs. To estimate ui three possible distributions are 
characteristically used: half normal: N
+
(0, σ), exponential and truncated normal. The 
work reported below initially estimated ui for all three distributions. But estimation of 
truncated normal efficiency terms was not effective.
1
 Hence the results reported below 
use half normal and exponential distributions for ui. 
 
                                                
1 With truncated normal ui the maximum likelihood iterations were frequently either non-concave or 
did not converge. In addition when estimation of ui was possible the estimates were frequently 
unrealistically small compared to half normal and exponential formulations as reported below. 
Stochastic frontier modelling, such as formulation [1], is now the standard 
econometric method of efficiency analysis and is arguably superior to alternative 
parametric and non-parametric methods (Greene, 2007). This is the case for two broad 
reasons. First, the inclusion of standard residuals (vi) allows for data noise in a way 
that cannot be accommodated with non-parametric methods. Secondly, the explicit 
modelling of firm efficiency (ui) allows efficiency to impact on all estimated 
coefficients which is not the case with other parametric methods. 
 
With cross section data, as used here, effective stochastic frontier estimation requires 
independence of vi and ui. This assumption appears to be empirically valid with the 
results reported below. With a cross section – time series panel this assumption is not 
necessary. But a panel based method is deemed inappropriate for current purposes. 
The present analysis is based on 7350 UK manufacturing firms that existed in both 
2003 and 1998 (the reason for this earlier year is explained below). This data set 
covers the full firm size range, and hence allows an effective analysis, of for example 
market structure impacts, than a more restricted sample of larger firms. Part of the 
validation analysis undertaken here involves projecting forward to 2004 for the 2003 
sample. This reduces the data set from 7350 to 4680 firms. The 2670 “lost” firms are 
primarily small and medium sized and occurs because of data availability as well as 
real firm exit which itself is greater for small rather than larger firms. It follows that a 
panel data set covering the full firm size range would be highly unbalanced for small 
and medium sized firms, with obvious impacts on estimation effectiveness. 
Alternatively an (approximately) complete panel must be firm size restricted given the 
data source discussed shortly. It follows from these comments that the data set used 
here identifies the significance of issues involving the (approximate) full firm size 
range e.g. market concentration effects, but is silent on other issues e.g. dynamic 
effects which are left for later work. 
 
Using the stochastic frontier model specified in [1] we can define the degree of 
efficiency (e) of the i’th firm 
 [ )
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where FRiR is notional frontier revenue for firm i, i.e. with ui = 0. 
Using [2] it follows that 
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In [3] i
FR
i RR − is a monetary measure of TCs (above the necessary minimum) in 
terms of an imputed opportunity cost of “unexploited” firm revenue. This claim that 
i
FR
i RR − is an empirical measure of TCs is arguably consistent with the definition 
offered above that TCs are (1) “maladaption” costs with inefficient transactions; (2) 
“haggling” and “bonding” costs; and (3) set-up and running costs of organisations. 
With the qualification that all these costs are those above the necessary minimum. 
 
It follows that we can re-write [3] as 
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In [4] the denominator is not a measure of actual firm size. So we can define: 
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The formulation in [5] is our required measure of firm TC intensity. 
 
Data and empirical method 
The first stage of the empirical method involves estimation of trans-log stochastic 
frontier functions as specified in [1] at two digit UK industry level for 2003. Ri, Li and 
Ki are respectively firm turnover, number of employees and total assets. The data is 
extracted from the common data source Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME). For 
reasons set out below a common data set for 1998 is also needed. The total number of 
firms involved is 7350 in SICs 20-36 i.e. most UK manufacturing. SICs 23 and 37 are 
excluded because of insufficient firms in both 1998 and 2003 for effective stochastic 
frontier estimation. For each of the 16 two digit industries, using 2003 data stochastic 
frontier models were estimated, with ui being estimated as both half normal and 
exponential distributions. Hence a total of 32 separate production functions were 
estimated using standard STATA routines. For reasons set out below an equivalent set 
of production functions is required using 1998 data. The method used here is therefore 
based on estimating 64 stochastic frontier production functions. 
 
The stochastic frontier regressions are well specified (full details are available from 
the author). The only significant issue is a requirement to control for 
heteroskedasticity in ui. This is a common issue and reflects a firm size impact on the 
extent of inefficiency (Kumbhaker and Lovell, 2000). Intuitively, larger firms can be 
more inefficient in absolute terms. Effective estimation therefore required modelling 
ui in each industry as a linear function of a firm’s capital:labour ratio. Post-estimation 
involves predicting ei as defined in [2] and following this TCi/Ri as defined in [5] can 
be calculated. The various firm TC estimates calculated at the two digit level are 
collected into the full data set involving 7350 firms.  
 
Table 1 here: see end 
 
The general sample data characteristics at the industry level for 2003 are shown in 
table 1. The key characteristics can be highlighted as follows. The two final columns 
show industry median estimates for TC intensity with half normal and exponential 
distributions for ui.
2 These TC estimates clearly differ by industry, hence we might 
conclude the somewhat standard matter that industry specific determinants exist. In 
addition the average exponential estimates are consistently less than the half normal 
estimates, also a somewhat standard finding (Greene, 2007). Table 1 also shows that 
the industries differ in their numbers equivalent Herfindahl index and profit per 
employee, both of which is to be expected. The reason for using profit per employee 
is considered below. 
 
Tables 2a and 2b here: see end 
 
Tables 2a and 2b show correlation matrices at respectively industry and firm levels for 
key variables to be used here. Note that the firm level equivalent of the numbers 
equivalent Herfindahl index is taken to be a firm’s market share, but a reduction in 
1/H requires an increase in large firm market share. The only real similarity between 
the two correlation matrices is that profit per employee and exponential estimates of 
TCs appear to be positively correlated at both industry and firm levels. Apart from 
π/L and TCe the other correlations at industry and firm levels are somewhat different. 
This suggests that an adequate analysis of profitability variation should take account 
                                                
2
 It can be noted that the TC estimates reported in table 1are of the same order as those reported by 
Wallis and North (1986). The latter authors use a different methodology, they simply add up what 
they consider to be resources used in transaction industries. Their results show that TCs have grown 
from 25% of GNP in 1870 to 45% in 1970.  
of both levels. This reflects the long standing finding that intra-industry variability in 
profitability and its determinants is as important as inter-industry variability (for 
example Ravenscraft 1983, Mueller 1986, Hall and Weiss, 1967). 
 
In table 2b we can recognise the small but positive correlation between K/L and π/L. 
This correlation may be driven by the common denominators (i.e. number of 
employees in both cases), but the low value indicates this may not be the only 
explanation. A similar possibility of spurious correlation might also exist between π/L 
and TC intensity: employment is an input into the 2003 production function that 
generates 2003 revenue. But the difference between the (π/L, TCh) and (π/L, TCe) 
coefficients is informative in this regard. If the small but positive correlation between 
π/L and TCe is driven by the denominators we might expect this to also be the case 
for the (π/L, TCh) correlation, but the latter is effectively zero. In addition it is 
standard in the analysis of, for example, advertising’s impact on profitability to 
measure advertising as a proportion of revenue and profitability as, for example return 
on sales or capital (see, for example, the seminal work of Comanor and Wilson 1967, 
and the system based analysis of Geroski 1982). This standard analysis of advertising 
appears not to be concerned with the “denominator effects” suggested here, even 
though some time ago it was recognised that spurious relationships may be identified 
(Miller, 1969). Finally, any spurious correlation between π/L and TC/R requires 
assumptions about firm and average industry K/L. In short we can be aware of the 
possibility of spurious correlation involving denominators, but this preliminary 
discussion indicates that any such problem is possibly not significant. Separating 
potential spurious correlation from a more substantive impact of TCs on profitability 
is part of the analysis undertaken below. In general terms later analysis confirms this 
earlier discussion and indicates that the “denominator problem” appears not to be 
significant. 
 
Transaction costs and profitability 
Analysis of the relationship between profitability and TCs is undertaken in two stages. 
First, profit functions are estimated with control variables and TC variables at industry 
and firm levels. Following this the validity of the basic relationships identified in the 
first stage is explored to take account of (1) non-identifiable determinants of 
profitability; (2) the possible endogeneity of TCs and (3) the possible spurious 
positive correlation between profitability and TC intensity through the denominators 
of the ratios used. 
 
In all regressions estimated here profitability is measured as profits per employee. In 
the industrial organisation field, return on sales is a common measure of profitability 
because, among other reasons, this is derived as a left hand side variable in theoretical 
profit equations based on standard oligopoly models. This is not used here for two 
reasons. First this would introduce potentially spurious correlation because the 
denominators of profit and TC ratios would the same. Secondly, organisational 
problems are largely caused by human interaction and the management of employees. 
Hence in this context firm performance can track these issues if profitability is 
measured per employee. In all the regressions estimated here profit is measured as 
firm profit before tax. 
 
Three control variables are used in the profit equations:  
1. Firm 2003 capital:labour ratio. Capital is measured as total firm assets and labour 
as the number of employees. This is intended to track potential scale effects on 
profitability. But in later discussion this variable is used, in addition, for other 
purposes. 
2. Firm sales growth over the five year interval 1998-2003 i.e. (R2003)/(R1998). It is 
anticipated that sales growth positively impacts on profitability. 
3. Firm 2003 market share i.e. the ratio of firm sales to total sales of all firms at the 
two digit industry level. This is intended to track potential monopoly effects on 
profitability. 
Quadratic effects are introduced when significant to track possible non-linear 
relationships on profitability. 
 
Table 3 here: see end. 
 
Table 3 reports the firm level profit regression with only the control variables. The 
negative coefficient on revenue growth is counter intuitive and should be seen in the 
light of later discussion, as is also the case with the insignificant estimate for market 
share. The significant quadratic effect with K/L has a maximum at K/L = 72165, 
derived by differentiating the quadratic and setting the first derivative equal to zero. 
This maximum K/L impact is considerably outside the K/L data range, hence we can 
conclude that the quadratic relationship is monotonically positive but with 
diminishing effect on profitability. Literature on firm growth and profitability in the 
UK (for example, Dunne and Hughes 1994) indicates declining firm profitability with 
increased firm size. One interpretation of the result here is that the monotonically 
positive relationship is tracking the denominators of the K/L and π/L ratios but the 
diminishing effect is countering this automatic correlation in a way that is consistent 
with the wider literature. 
 
Table 4 here: see end. 
 
Table 4 reports the first set of estimates that include TC variables. These first results 
identify TC effects at the industry level. Firm specific impacts are introduced below. 
The intention here is to examine the sign of the relationship between TCs and 
profitability, and in addition the possible existence of a “Penrose effect” with a 
positive relationship. For this reason a full set of quadratics on TC/R are included. In 
table 4 TC effects are introduced as industry slope dummies. The quadratic TC/R is 
the first set of columns reflects the impact of the omitted dummy (SIC22). In the 
standard way, the industry slope dummies therefore reflect the additional effects. An 
equivalent set of industry intercept dummies were also included but the results are of 
secondary importance and so are not reported here. It is clear that the introduction of 
industry TC effects has a significant impact on overall explanatory power, as 
indicated by the adjusted R2 compared to table 3. In addition it is clear that the TC 
impacts on profitability are consistent with both positive and negative industry 
specific impacts; a more detailed analysis is undertaken shortly. Of course the positive 
relationships may result from “denominator effects”, but at this stage we can draw the 
potential conclusion that effects of both signs might exist. With respect to the control 
variables in table 4, for K/L and revenue growth the estimates are equivalent to those 
reported in table 3. But the market share effects are different. Although insignificant, 
the estimated minima occur at market shares of 0.15 and 0.11 for respectively the 
half-normal and exponential estimates. This indicates that increasing market share has 
a positive impact on profits only for the largest firms. 
 
The formulation reported in table 4 implicitly assumes that (1) all firms (in an 
industry) have the same incentive to reduce TCs; and (2) have the same opportunities 
to invest in dynamic TCs. Or more probabilistically, the incentives and opportunities 
are randomly associated with firm types. But the correlation matrices reported in 
tables 2a and 2b indicate that firm and industry effects appear different. In which case 
the implicit assumptions in (1) and (2) need not be valid. To examine the possibility 
that TC incentives and opportunities are systematically related to particular firm 
types, as well as TCs having industry specific impacts, we can hypothesise that 
incentives and opportunities depend on three factors: (1) monopoly power, defined by 
market share at the two digit level; (2) firm sales growth, as defined earlier; and (3) 
technical conditions of production, as proxied by firm K/L. It follows that these three 
factors will have direct effects on π/L (as control variables) and potential indirect 
effects with π/L that interact with TC/R. The results of introducing both industry and 
firm specific TC effects in this way are reported in table 5. 
 
Table 5 here: see end. 
 
When tables 4 and 5 are compared it is clear that the interaction terms have a 
significant impact on overall explanatory power, particularly for the exponential TC 
cost regression. With respect to the direct effects of the control variables, K/L has the 
same qualitative impact as in table 4, as does the effect of market share on 
profitability. But we can see that revenue growth has the intuitively expected positive 
direct impact on profitability via the squared term (the linear term is zero). It is 
interesting that the identification of this expected effect requires the use of the TC 
interaction terms that are intended to track firm specific managerial incentives and 
opportunities. 
 
Table 6 here: see end. 
 
The industry specific TC impacts on profitability, not reported in table 5, are 
summarised in table 6. Here there is an assumed relevant range for a firm’s TC 
intensity that has an upper bound of one. With this bound the quadratic TC effects in 
table 5 define three general effects: monotonic positive, monotonic negative and 
inverted U. It is clear that there is evidence for both static TCs (i.e. a monotonic 
negative impact) and dynamic TCs (i.e. a monotonic positive impact). The 
exponential estimates, for which TC/R are smaller (see table 1), show a lower 
incidence of dynamic TCs. This is consistent with the planning and management of 
change requiring a certain degree of organisational excess capacity, along the lines 
suggested by Penrose (1959). 
 
Finally, with respect to table 5, we can make reference to the interaction effects. All 
interpretation of these interaction terms are restricted to the relevant data ranges. For 
the (TC/R, Rev Gr) terms, it is apparent that slower firm growth increases the positive 
impact of TCs on profitability (or reduces the negative impact), a result that is the 
same for both TC measures. A possible interpretation here is that firm growth impacts 
on development incentives. For the (TC/R, Share) terms, the results imply that 
increased market share increases the positive impact of TCs on profitability, but with 
diminishing effect. This effect is consistent with both TC measures. A possible 
interpretation here is that monopoly power increases dynamic incentives and abilities, 
along the lines suggested by Schumpeter (1942) and Galbraith (1967). Alternatively 
we might suggest that reduced monopoly power increases TC economising incentives 
and hence the relevance of static TC analysis. For the (K/L, TC/R) terms the results 
also show the same impact for both TC measures. We can summarise this impact as 
follows: increased capital intensity increases the negative impact of TCs on 
profitability (over the relevant range for K/L). Or equivalently, reduced scale of 
production increases the dynamic TC effects on profitability. A possible interpretation 
here involves the flexibility advantages of smaller scale production. Note that this 
effect cannot be accounted for by denominator spurious correlation. 
 
Transaction costs and profitability: further analysis 
This section of the paper introduces three possible qualifications to the results 
identified in the previous section: 
1. Many effects on profitability cannot be readily identified hence the earlier results 
may suffer from missing variable bias. An attempt will be made to control for any 
missing variables by first differencing the profit equation over the interval 1998-2003. 
The intention here is to remove any non-identifiable fixed effects on profitability. 
2. The second complexity introduced here involves accounting for the possible 
endogeneity of TCs. This involves estimating a TC equation and using predicted 
TC/R in the profit equations rather than actual TC/R. 
3. Finally an attempt will be made to control for any “denominator effects” that might 
be introducing spurious correlation. These “denominator effects” of TC/R on π/L 
potentially operate via the 2003 production function i.e. increasing 2003 L 
automatically increases 2003 R. To control for this possible effect 2003 right hand 
side variables will be used to explain 2004 π/L. 
 
Tables 7a, 7b here: see end. 
 
Tables 7a and 7b report first difference regressions for the interval 1998-2003. In 
these regressions the interaction terms have been omitted because their interpretation 
is difficult with a first difference model. As the interaction terms were included to 
track firm, rather than industry, specific effects, their omission implies that a first 
differenced model can be used to analyse industry specific TC effects. If the firm 
specific effects are constant over the 1998-2003 interval these will be removed as 
fixed effects. In addition the year 1998 TC/R industry levels are included as right 
hand side variables in the form of slope dummies. There are two reasons for including 
TC/R levels. First, the results are interesting in their own right i.e. do levels of TCs 
appear to influence future changes in profitability. Secondly, repeat reference has 
been made to a potential “denominator problem” that might bias results. While we 
might experience spurious correlation via denominators when left and right hand side 
variables are both in levels or first differences, no such spurious correlation can be 
expected when we regress a dependent variable in first differences on independent 
variables in levels.  
 
In tables 7a and 7b the control variables show the same qualitative estimates as with 
earlier level based regressions. In particular note the expected positive coefficient on  
revenue growth (note not the change in growth); earlier this expected sign was not 
estimated without interaction terms. Experiments with the control variable 1998 levels 
being used as independent variables yielded insignificant coefficients when the TC/R 
levels are also included. With respect to the change in the industry TC intensities, 
more of the industries show negative or insignificant effects on profitability. A 
negative relationship is viewed here as indicating the relevance of static TC theory. 
But some industries still have positive impacts of TC/R on π/L in both tables 7a and 
7b. In addition for these industries with positive impacts the quadratic term is negative 
indicating a “Penrose effect” of diminishing effectiveness of transaction investments.  
 
Turning to the final three columns in tables 7a and 7b, two features of the estimated 
coefficients can be highlighted. For many industries the level results are similar in 
sign and significance as the first difference coefficients. Of particular significance are 
the positive estimated impacts on profitability for SICs 21, 27, 29, 30 (in 7a). For 
these industries as we can conclude that the level of TCs appears to be associated with 
a growth in profitability, without qualification of a potential denominator effect. In 
short, there appears to be evidence for a dynamic view of TCs in some industries. The 
second feature of the levels estimates is that for some industries they differ from the 
change in TC/R estimated coefficients. For example, in SICs 26 and 32 a negative 
impact on profitability in TC/R changes coincide with a positive impact in levels. 
Alternatively in SIC34 a positive relationship in changes coincides with an 
insignificant relationship in levels. These differences add a potentially rich 
perspective to TC theory. If we view organisational expenditures as assets their levels 
may influence future profitability, particularly if these assets are sunk. These levels 
may require a different explanatory framework compared to when organisational 
resources are viewed as variable expenditures with their changes influencing changes 
in profitability. In both cases static and/or dynamic TCs may be useful. 
 The discussion can now turn to the second complexity highlighted above that involves 
accounting for the possible endogeneity of TCs and the extent to which this may have 
biased earlier results. This involves estimating TC equations and using predicted 
TC/R in profit equations rather than actual TC/R. To model TCs the key factor from 
static theory (e.g. Williamson, 1985) is asset specificity. This is proxied here by K/L, 
with industry K/L slope dummies as well as intercept dummies in the TC equation. In 
addition firm growth and market share are used as explanatory variables in TC 
equations. The logic here concerns the determination of dynamic TCs, as discussed 
above. Using the same logic as earlier, firm specific TCs are modelled using 
interaction terms. The resulting regression equations are reported in table 8. It is 
apparent that the modelling used here is effective in accounting for variation in TC/R. 
In addition the significance of the explanatory variables indicates that both firm and 
industry specific factors are relevant to explain the determination of TCs. 
 
Table 8 here: see end 
Table 9 here: see end 
 
Table 9 reports the estimated profitability equations with predicted TC/R as an 
explanatory variable. These regressions are the equivalent of those reported in table 5 
above. The key issue here is, of course, the TC effects on profitability. Table 10 
summarises the industry TC effects based on the dummies not reported in table 9. 
Comparison of tables 10 and 6 indicates a reduced importance of a positive impact of 
TCs on profitability, particularly for the exponential measure of TC/R. But there is 
still some evidence in support of the relevance of dynamic TCs.  
Table 10 here: see end. 
 
For the firm specific TCs, i.e. the interaction terms in table 9, the K/L interaction 
terms indicate different results for the two different TC/R measures. Earlier in table 5 
these interaction terms gave similar results. The half normal results in table 9 are 
consistent with those found earlier: reduced K/L reduces the negative impact of TCs. 
A possible interpretation here, offered earlier, involved possible flexibility advantages 
of smaller scale production. In table 9, for the exponential measures of TC/R these 
flexibility advantages of smaller scale are not evident. Instead once the endogeneity of 
TC/R to K/L is recognised increasing scale of firm of activity increases the positive 
impact of TCs on profitability. If these results are considered reliable, and if the 
flexibility interpretation is accepted, of significance may be the estimated size of half-
normal and exponential TC/R. It will be recalled (see table 1) that exponential TC/R 
estimates are consistently smaller. This may indicate that in the absence of sufficient 
investment in organisational assets the flexibility advantages of smaller scale activity 
need not exist.  
 
With respect to the revenue growth interaction terms in table 9 we also see different 
results for the two TC/R measures, if the estimated coefficient for (TC/R)*RevGr is 
viewed as non-zero given the t statistic of 1.77. The exponential results are consistent 
with those in table 5, this was interpreted earlier as slower firm growth having an 
incentive effect for the development of dynamic TCs. But the half-normal results are 
somewhat different. Here, up to TC/R = 0.72 increasing revenue growth increases the 
positive impact of TCs on profitability. Using a similar interpretation to that just 
offered the level of TCs may be relevant here. After controlling for the endogeneity of 
TC/R to firm growth, lower TCs, i.e. working closer to the productive frontier, 
appears to promote the dynamic incentives from lower firm growth. Finally for the 
market share TC terms, over the relevant range of TC/R < 1, increasing market share 
increases the positive impacts of TCs on profitability. The earlier (in table 5) U 
shaped relationship can therefore be viewed as a result of TC/R endogeneity. Table 9 
can therefore be interpreted that for all market shares increasing market power 
increases dynamic TC incentives or reducing market power increases static TC 
incentives. 
 
Table 11 here: see end 
 
Finally in this section we will control for the possible “denominator effects” that 
might be introducing spurious correlation. These “denominator effects” of TC/R on 
π/L potentially operate via the 2003 production function i.e. increasing 2003 L 
automatically increases 2003 R. To control for this possible effect 2003 right hand 
side variables will be used to explain 2004 π/L. Because of data availability and firm 
exit using 2004 π/L reduces the sample size from 7350 to 4680 firms, with the 
reduction particularly affecting the presence of small firms. Table 11 shows summary 
results that can be compared to those in table 5. The industry TC effects will be 
summarised below. The firm specific interaction terms are, for K/L and RevGr, 
qualitatively the same as the earlier table over relevant data ranges. For the TC/R and 
market share terms the relationships reported in table 11 are either positive over 
relevant data ranges (for half normal estimates) or insignificant, i.e. they are closer to 
the results after controlling for endogeneity reported in table 9. 
 
Table 12 here: see end 
 
The industry specific TC effects can be derived from the slope dummy variables not 
reported in table 11. The overall results are summarised in table 12. For the half 
normal estimates of TC/R it is apparent that there is mainly a positive relationship 
between 2003 TCs and 2004 profitability. This more than replicates the earlier results 
reported in table 5. Using earlier logic this reinforces the conclusion that in many UK 
manufacturing industries dynamic TCs are important. For the exponential estimates in 
table 12 we see a reduced importance of a monotonic positive relationship that mirrors 
earlier findings. But in addition in table 12, 10 from the 16 industries have slope 
dummies that are insignificant at, at least, the 10% level. For all earlier results the 
industry slope dummies are consistently significant. If we exclude the insignificant 
results in table 11 for the exponential estimates, the significant six industries have two 
monotonic positive and four monotonic negative relationships i.e. the significant 
results mirror earlier findings. If the logic underlying the results in tables 11 and 12 is 
accepted we can conclude that earlier findings do not appear to be significantly biased 
by a spurious “denominator effect”. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
The profit equations estimated here indicate that for UK manufacturing both static and 
dynamic TCs are relevant. In addition this relevance appears to be at both firm and 
industry levels and in addition can be identified in a first difference profit equation for 
both TC changes and levels. These conclusions appear robust to endogeneity analysis 
as well as controlling for possible spurious correlation. In this final section of the 
paper an attempt will be made to identify the possible characteristics of the industries 
that have been classified as positive or negative in their relationships between TC/R 
and profitability.  
 
Table 13 here: see end 
 
Consider table 13 that summarises the industry level results presented above in tables 
5 and 6. N is the number of industries defined as either monotonic positive or 
monotonic negative in table 6. The final four columns show median values across the 
industries in each category for the numbers equivalent Herfindahl index, industry 
profitability, revenue growth and TC intensity levels. Although the numbers of 
industries involved are small a set of conclusions appear to be present. Firms in 
industries with a positive relationship between TC intensity and profitability appear to 
exhibit less competitive market structures, lower profitability and revenue growth and 
lower TC intensity levels. These generalisations apply to both TC measures.  
 
To a large extent these industry level conclusions appear to be consistent with the firm 
level analysis undertaken above using interaction terms. Consider first the apparent 
relationship with 1/H. This indicates the possible presence of a “Schumpeter” effect in 
the positive impact of TCs on profitability as well as more competitive markets 
promoting TC economising. These relationships with 1/H appear to be particularly the 
case with exponential TC estimates. A possible interpretation here is that as these 
estimates are lower than for half normal TCs (see table 1), the general lower degree of 
slack might lead to a stronger market structure impact. These industry level 
conclusions are consistent with firm level results reported above. But the earlier 
results reported a subtlety with respect to firm flexibility: a smaller scale of 
production appeared to promote greater positive TC effects on profitability (as 
indicated by the interaction between TC/R and K/L). A possible way of reconciling 
these market structure and flexibility effects is to use the distinction, emphasised 
earlier, between TCs as sunk assets and TCs as current expenditures, as explored with 
the differenced model reported in tables 7a and 7b. More competitive market 
structures require, ceteris paribus, smaller firms. The lower organisational overheads 
involved imply smaller TCs as sunk assets that also support the competitive 
structures. It follows that the greater relative importance of TCs as current 
expenditures will be picked up as flexibility advantages of smaller scale.  
 
With respect to π/L and revenue growth in table 13, there is evidence of an incentive 
effect in organisational development consistent with the firm level results found 
earlier. Finally with respect to TC/R in table 13 there is evidence in support of a 
“Penrose” effect, also found earlier, in that the negative relationships between TC/R 
and profitability involve higher levels of TC/R. This effect is particularly strong with 
the half normal TC estimates. This is perhaps not surprising as these TC estimates are 
higher than the exponential form, and hence are more likely to pick up a “Penrose” 
effect. 
 
In short, these general conclusions at both firm and industry levels indicate a robust 
set of findings regarding the impacts of TCs on firm performance. They also indicate 
that these impacts can be complex, indicating a danger with oversimplified analysis. 
Finally, the robustness of the results indicate that TC effects can be effectively 
modelled using the stochastic frontier methodology introduced here and open up a 
potentially wide set of applications for future research using this methodology. 
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Table 1 
2003 industry level sample data characteristics 
SIC N 1/H Profit per 
employee 
 Revenue 
growth 
 TC/R  
half normal 
 TC/R 
exponen. 
 
20 141 40.10 4.05 1.26 0.34 0.20 
21 270 17.98 1.83 1.08 0.19 0.12 
22 971 44.30 4.19 1.16 0.42 0.26 
24 751 12.88 5.16 1.16 0.56 0.32 
25 456 82.58 2.58 1.13 0.25 0.15 
26 241 11.89 4.64 1.13 0.28 0.20 
27 267 7.95 1.59 0.95 0.46 0.28 
28 1053 38.18 1.96 1.01 0.36 0.22 
29 739 29.54 2.67 1.03 0.44 0.24 
30 164 8.59 2.72 1.02 0.25 0.11 
31 503 26.32 1.30 1.03 0.36 0.21 
32 273 12.42 1.24 0.95 0.43 0.27 
33 370 32.03 4.03 1.16 0.44 0.26 
34 151 10.03 1.51 1.17 0.49 0.27 
35 183 6.68 2.84 1.13 0.53 0.31 
36 817 58.35 2.28 1.14 0.28 0.17 
Notes 
1. N = number of sampled firms in the industry; 1/H = numbers equivalent 
Herfindahl index defined at the 2 digit level. 
2. Firm revenue growth is defined over the five year interval 1998 to 2003: 
R2003/R1998. 
3. Industry averages for profit per employee, revenue growth, and the TC/R data 
are medians for the sample of firms in each industry. 
4. The two final columns report median transaction cost estimates for half normal 
and exponentially distributed efficiency effects. 
 
 
Table 2a 
2003 industry level correlations: N=16 
 
   1/H   π/L Rev Gr  TCh  TCe 
1/H 1.0000     
π/L 0.0632 1.0000    
RevGr 0.3168 0.6462 1.0000   
TCh -0.4041 0.1579 0.0379 1.0000  
TCe -0.3713 0.1903 0.0372 0.9662 1.0000
 
 
Table 2b 
2003 firm level correlations: N=7350 
 
 K/L Share π/L Rev Gr TCh TCe 
K/L 1.0000      
Share 0.0163 1.0000     
π/L 0.1572 0.0215 1.0000    
Rev Gr 0.0019 -0.0012 -0.0157 1.0000   
TCh 0.1561 -0.0101 0.0002 -0.0011 1.0000  
TCe 0.4769 -0.0071 0.1717 -0.0011 0.4069 1.0000
 
1/H = the numbers Herfindahl index defined at the 2 digit level; Share = firm market 
share with the total market defined as the sum of firm revenues at the two digit 
industry level; K/L = firm capital:labour ratio defined as the ratio of firm total assets 
to number of employees; π/L = profit per employee; Rev Gr = R2003/R1998; TCh and 
TCe are transaction cost intensities under respectively half normal and exponential 
assumptions. In table 2a the data is that used in table 1.  
 
Table 3 
OLS regression: dependent variable: firm profit per employee 
 
 Coeff. t stat 
K/L .0840009 43.34 
(K/L)
2 
-5.82e-07 -40.72 
Rev Gr -.0377337 -1.76 
Share 36.05227 0.25 
Cons -5.197244 -3.08 
   
 N=7350  
 adjR2 = 0.204  
 
  
 
Table 4 
OLS regressions: dependent variable 2003 π/L 
 
    Half normal       Exponential  
 Coeff. t stat   Coeff t stat  Coeff. t stat  Coeff t stat 
K/L .1162444 58.25  int20 51.64014 0.88  .1239457 56.38  60.11521 0.80 
(K/L)
2 
-7.86e-07 -56.40  intsq20 .9527216 0.04  -8.05e-07 -53.87  .647884 0.02 
Rev Gr -.0392787 -2.20  int21 68.10988 6.15  -.0405536 -2.32  75.16652 6.13 
Share -364.2193 -1.49  intsq21 -1.162134 -3.12  -318.4418 -1.33  -1.395505 -3.00 
Share
2 
1201.23 1.13  int24 -11.56834 -1.60  1464.635 1.41  53.31943 11.54 
TC/R -54.25172 -12.78  intsq24 .8294653 3.86  -61.68538 -13.42  -.7601264 -12.24 
(TC/R)
2 
.616265 11.98  int25 51.809 3.58  .774675 12.49  57.9821 3.27 
Cons 20.07344 4.57  intsq25 -1.12259 -1.63  11.85332 2.93  -1.640588 -1.52 
    int26 119.4239 2.47     135.8133 3.70 
    intsq26 -46.1454 -6.48     -39.23322 -8.02 
    int27 137.4005 22.26     152.2005 25.25 
    intsq27 -3.083142 -32.98     -2.982142 -33.67 
    int28 -3.966794 -0.46     17.65357 2.14 
    intsq28 -1.169366 -3.53     -1.13713 -4.30 
    int29 74.62894 14.36     89.54632 14.51 
    intsq29 -.9332056 -13.17     -1.37472 -12.49 
    int30 101.2753 3.17     9604.578 10.08 
    intsq30 -8.246281 -1.02     -43727.29 -15.16 
    int31 59.80902 9.91     69.76789 9.27 
    intsq31 -.803459 -9.91     -1.141172 -8.00 
    int32 1.416559 0.07     -6.827788 -0.31 
    intsq32 10.89827 4.94     17.53943 5.50 
    int33 30.71221 2.08     34.45009 2.32 
    intsq33 .3948681 0.29     .3946238 0.42 
    int34 67.58563 10.70     75.76744 10.90 
    intsq34 -.8597313 -9.04     -1.082257 -8.99 
    int35 23.02662 1.72     20.20739 1.63 
    intsq35 -.1271169 -0.18     .2375852 0.42 
    int36 53.05906 9.05     57.78581 9.82 
    intsq36 -.6072986 -6.74     -.7269971 -8.86 
adj R
2
 = 0.451  N = 7350    adjR
2 
= 0.474 
omitted dummy = SIC22 (N=972)       
intxy = (TC/R)*dummy(SICxy) 
intsqxy = (TC/R)
2
*dummy(SICxy) 
intercept dummies not reported       
 
Table 5 
OLS regressions: dependent variable π/L 
 
 Half normal   Exponential  
 Coeff t stat  Coeff t stat 
K/L .1407462 57.18  .102828 37.27 
(K/L)
2 
-8.06e-07 -50.51  2.37e-06 18.11 
Rev Gr -.0277197 -0.46  -.0039748 -0.07 
(Rev Gr)
2 
.0000254 1.23  .0001359 6.65 
Share -597.3471 -2.26  -627.0653 -2.70 
Share
2 
1581.029 1.52  1538.274 1.59 
TC/R -29.82199 -6.71  -28.41477 -6.02 
(TC/R)
2 
-.3411939 -3.03  .28776 4.40 
(TC/R)*(K/L) -.00765 -14.24  -.0044243 -22.76 
(TC/R)
2
*(K/L) .0002538 10.68  8.61e-06 13.14 
(TC/R)*(Rev Gr) -.151008 -1.01  -1.420557 -8.44 
(TC/R)2*(Rev Gr) -.0548624 -3.34  .2075496 20.20 
(TC/R)*share 448.0436 1.55  1387.72 7.64 
(TC/R)2*Share -99.16152 -2.76  -308.416 -12.14 
Cons 4.389281 1.00  4.118737 1.08 
 
adjR2 = 0.475  N = 7350 adjR2 = 0.540 
Slope and intercept dummies not reported 
 
Table 6 
Transaction cost impacts on profitability 
 
  Half normal Exponential 
Monotonic +ve 8 industries 6 industries 
Monotonic -ve 7 industries 9 industries 
Inverted U 1 industry 1 industry 
Notes 
Calculations based on regression results in table 5. 
The quadratic effects are measured over an assumed relevant range of TC/R < 1. 
 
Table 7a 
OLS regression: dependent variable 1998-03 change in π/L (half normal estimates) 
 
 Coeff. t stat   Coeff. t stat   Coeff. t stat 
ΔK/L .1177434 52.11  Δint20 -18.3919 -0.23  int98_20 -2.872869 -0.05 
Δ(K/L)
2 
-7.98e-07 -50.94  Δintsq20 6.254778 0.20  intsq98_20 2.3814 0.08 
Δshare -484.5063 -1.72  Δint21 18.14981 1.67  int98_21 23.59721 1.28 
RevGr .9814552 2.76  Δintsq21 -.7025364 -1.80  intsq98_21 -.7538504 -1.95 
ΔTC/R .3755554 0.36  Δint24 -57.1155 -8.70  int98_24 -56.2061 -8.71 
Δ(TC/R)
2 
-.0030831 -2.21  Δintsq24 1.12944 5.06  intsq98_24 1.124748 5.04 
Cons -10.04553 -2.55  Δint25 -5.297906 -0.36  int98_25 -5.315488 -0.37 
    Δintsq25 -.3821254 -0.53  intsq98_25 -.3861476 -0.53 
    Δint26 -38.30508 -0.62  int98_26 109.2765 1.66 
    Δintsq26 -31.81194 -3.59  intsq98_26 -59.38907 -2.94 
    Δint27 28.17937 4.97  int98_27 29.1531 5.21 
    Δintsq27 -1.451919 -15.51  intsq98_27 -1.455014 -15.54 
    Δint28 -39.10399 -4.69  int98_28 -35.75073 -4.41 
    Δintsq28 -.2783394 -0.80  intsq98_28 -.2867695 -0.82 
    Δint29 24.59177 7.18  int98_29 31.21923 4.89 
    Δintsq29 -.3858489 -7.36  intsq98_29 -.6491094 -5.10 
    Δint30 74.44828 2.21  int98_30 69.99164 2.08 
    Δintsq30 -12.25391 -1.45  intsq98_30 -12.23886 -1.45 
    Δint31 -22.01618 -2.72  int98_31 -15.31144 -2.28 
    Δintsq31 .9803762 3.72  intsq98_31 .8725162 3.65 
    Δint32 -65.0745 -3.03  int98_32 -27.07235 -1.01 
    Δintsq32 12.09669 4.93  intsq98_32 7.854976 2.51 
    Δint33 -17.82921 -1.20  int98_33 -22.98947 -1.55 
    Δintsq33 .7561736 0.53  intsq98_33 .7581786 0.53 
    Δint34 13.64107 2.56  int98_34 130.3323 1.15 
    Δintsq34 -.2657976 -3.07  intsq98_34 -77.0359 -1.10 
    Δint35 -14.92728 -1.00  int98_35 -10.77451 -0.34 
    Δintsq35 -.4630393 -0.57  intsq98_35 -1.047694 -0.16 
    Δint36 1.173213 0.23  int98_36 2.173763 0.43 
    Δintsq36 -.0287554 -0.33  intsq98_36 -.0325354 -0.37 
adjR
2
 =  0.440  N = 7350 
Intercept dummies not reported 
Omitted dummy = SIC22 (N=972) 
intxy = (TC/R)*dummy(SICxy) 
intsqxy = (TC/R)
2
*dummy(SICxy) 
Δintxy = change in intxy over the interval 1998-03. 
Δintsqxy = change in intsqxy over the interval 1998-03. 
int98_xy = 1998(TC/R)*dummy(SICxy) 
intsq98_xy = 1998(TC/R)
2
*dummy(SICxy) 
Table 7b 
OLS regression: dependent variable 1998-03 change in π/L (exponential estimates) 
 
 Coeff. t stat   Coeff. t stat   Coeff. t stat 
ΔK/L .1249671 48.80  dint20 -21.72126 -0.22  int98_20 -3.629302 -0.05 
Δ(K/L)
2 
-8.10e-07 -46.41  dintsq20 8.988348 0.19  intsq98_20 3.479451 0.08 
Δshare -645.517 -2.33  dint21 17.35808 1.45  int98_21 33.99425 2.59 
RevGr .6683363 1.93  dintsq21 -.7837887 -1.62  intsq98_21 -.8084331 -1.67 
ΔTC/R .3802608 0.37  dint24 -8.832999 -7.36  int98_24 -8.445688 -12.89 
Δ(TC/R)
2 
-.0033815 -2.46  dintsq24 .0178609 8.59  intsq98_24 .0140934 9.14 
Cons -9.870558 -2.56  dint25 -7.091507 -0.39  int98_25 -6.925905 -0.39 
    dintsq25 -.6706409 -0.59  intsq98_25 -.6740384 -0.59 
    dint26 -44.41096 -0.90  int98_26 112.4733 2.25 
    dintsq26 -24.26446 -3.82  intsq98_26 -40.22493 -4.92 
    dint27 34.41804 6.77  int98_27 35.6137 7.09 
    dintsq27 -1.288874 -16.83  intsq98_27 -1.29226 -16.88 
    dint28 -19.71224 -2.59  int98_28 -15.88047 -2.15 
    dintsq28 -.5591291 -2.04  intsq98_28 -.5726481 -2.09 
    dint29 37.85551 7.62  int98_29 41.35713 8.02 
    dintsq29 -.907019 -6.90  intsq98_29 -.9144851 -6.95 
    dint30 -4802.085 -14.03  int98_30 -4715.743 -13.99 
    dintsq30 (dropped)   intsq98_30 -1.900117 -4.10 
    dint31 -28.57739 -3.00  int98_31 -22.63122 -2.63 
    dintsq31 1.286667 4.03  intsq98_31 1.175959 3.92 
    dint32 -81.36869 -3.19  int98_32 -29.87775 -0.80 
    dintsq32 19.42132 5.42  intsq98_32 13.15381 2.72 
    dint33 -23.15801 -1.56  int98_33 -30.84296 -2.08 
    dintsq33 1.037244 1.05  intsq98_33 1.042926 1.05 
    dint34 13.53773 2.27  int98_34 125.0719 0.94 
    dintsq34 -.3237712 -2.88  intsq98_34 -64.14786 -0.84 
    dint35 -24.42918 -1.84  int98_35 -23.97626 -0.76 
    dintsq35 .1347651 0.21  intsq98_35 .560938 0.09 
    dint36 -1.654557 -0.33  int98_36 -.3692035 -0.07 
    dintsq36 .0140453 0.20  intsq98_36 .0094083 0.13 
adjR
2 
= 0.462  N = 7350 
Intercept dummies not reported 
Omitted dummy = SIC22 (N=972) 
intxy = (TC/R)*dummy(SICxy) 
intsqxy = (TC/R)
2
*dummy(SICxy) 
Δintxy = change in intxy over the interval 1998-03. 
Δintsqxy = change in intsqxy over the interval 1998-03. 
int98_xy = 1998(TC/R)*dummy(SICxy) 
intsq98_xy = 1998(TC/R)
2
*dummy(SICxy) 
 
 
 
  
Table 8 
OLS regressions: dependent variables TC/R 
 
   Half normal       Exponential   
 Coeff. t stat   Coeff. t stat  Coeff. t stat  Coeff. t stat 
K/L .0025586 13.63  kl20 -.000644 -0.18  .0040443 9.19  -.004652 -0.57 
(K/L)
2 
-9.65e-08 -5.44  klsq20 -1.69e-06 -0.41  9.66e-09 0.23  4.73e-07 0.05 
Share -7.576942 -1.65  kl21 .001156 0.59  -34.21613 -5.08  -.0026016 -0.57 
Share
2 
71.5979 3.96  klsq21 4.53e-06 2.34     5.16e-06 1.14 
RevGr    kl24 -.0020242 -10.60  -.0045517 -2.42  .0066409 14.63 
(K/L)*RevGr    klsq24 9.61e-08 5.42  .0000527 13.42  -2.48e-08 -0.60 
(K/L)
2
*RevGr -5.23e-10 -0.84  kl25 .0046796 4.78  -6.89e-08 -22.28  .0014957 0.65 
(K/L)*Share -.0509997 -5.99  klsq25 -3.98e-07 -1.73  .1661742 8.27  -3.54e-07 -0.66 
(K/L)
2
*Share -5.78e-06 -6.69  kl26 -.0023207 -6.75  -.0000925 -41.53  -.0035238 -4.37 
Cons .208718 2.98  klsq26 1.01e-07 4.38  -.1952635 -1.19  -1.08e-08 -0.20 
    kl27 -.0020587 -3.01     -.0021377 -1.33 
    klsq27 1.35e-06 10.63     1.23e-06 4.15 
    kl28 -.0003202 -0.75     -.0012982 -1.29 
    klsq28 2.04e-07 3.42     1.29e-07 0.92 
    kl29 .0082811 23.64     .0033845 4.12 
    klsq29 -6.00e-07 -20.72     -3.58e-07 -5.28 
    kl30 .0006473 0.61     -.0065345 -2.62 
    klsq30 4.83e-08 0.80     1.76e-06 12.40 
    kl31 -.0033503 -6.59     -.0045363 -3.80 
    klsq31 1.04e-06 14.24     7.09e-07 4.12 
    kl32 .0036282 3.63     -.003783 -1.61 
    klsq32 -3.84e-07 -3.86     8.91e-07 3.82 
    kl33 -.0021938 -2.53     -.0128494 -6.32 
    klsq33 1.56e-06 11.41     .0000136 40.54 
    kl34 -.0048084 -2.25     -.0101419 -2.03 
    klsq34 .0000164 13.05     .000016 5.43 
    kl35 .0040274 4.12     .0047649 2.07 
    klsq35 -8.07e-07 -3.69     -1.05e-06 -2.05 
    kl36 .0048051 7.85     .002993 2.08 
    klsq36 -5.12e-07 -3.07     -5.77e-07 -1.48 
adj R
2
 = 0.502    N = 7350  adjR
2
 = 0.694 
Intercept dummies not reported 
Omitted dummy = SIC22 (N=972) 
klxy = (K/L)*dummy(SICxy) 
klsqxy = (K/L)
2
*dummy(SICxy) 
 
Table 9 
OLS regressions: predicted TC/R, dependent variable π/L 
 
 Half normal   Exponential  
 Coeff t stat  Coeff t stat 
K/L .124214 53.46  .1991262 43.07 
(K/L)
2 
-6.19e-07 -33.10  -3.44e-06 -15.51 
RevGr -.2276305  -1.40  .0835901 1.44 
(RevGr)
2 
.0000537  1.23  -.0000151 -1.28 
Share -259.0483 -1.95  -1128.51 -4.61 
Share
2 
   2998.329 2.92 
TC/R -46.17087 -7.44  -53.53056 -18.78 
(TC/R)
2 
9.073467  12.65  -.2549716 -4.97 
(TC/R)*(K/L) -.0109711 -15.92  .0022837 10.46 
(TC/R)
2
*(K/L) -.0000825 -2.29  1.36e-06 2.48 
(TC/R)*RevGr .3632501  1.77  -.022357 -0.69 
(TC/R)2*RevGr -.2524741 -6.35  -.0813704 -10.85 
(TC/R)*Share 202.1798  2.46  -17.98297 -0.29 
(TC/R)2*Share -25.57002 -3.29  8.257962 1.57 
Cons 14.66159  3.29  .4706244 0.13 
 
adjR2 = 0.630  N = 7350 adjR2 = 0.513 
Slope and intercept industry dummies not reported 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Transaction cost impacts on profitability 
 
  Half normal Exponential 
Monotonic +ve 7 industries 3 industries 
Monotonic -ve 7 industries 12 industries 
Inverted U 1 industry 1 industry 
U 1 industry  
Notes 
Calculations based on regression results in table 9. 
The quadratic effects are measured over an assumed relevant range of TC/R < 1. 
 
Table 11 
OLS regressions: dependent variable 2004 π/L 
 
 Half normal   Exponential  
 Coeff t stat  Coeff t stat 
K/L .1358017 20.73  .0574698 7.13 
(K/L)
2 
-1.09e-06 -3.17  3.15e-06 7.16 
RevGr .1015026 1.23  .0924621 1.13 
Share -352.3438 -1.58  29.68352 0.13 
TC/R 80.07234 8.31  -1.370505 -0.14 
(TC/R)
2 
-5.885251 -23.47  .2104742 1.34 
(TC/R)*(K/L) -.0337521 -34.47  -.0066859 -10.20 
(TC/R)
2
*(K/L) .0014102 28.22  -8.88e-06 -1.56 
(TC/R)*RevGr -.4373179 -1.77  -.6040144 -1.56 
(TC/R)
2
*RevGr .1590676 4.73  .1528811 3.88 
(TC/R)*Share 788.765 2.09  -147.7611 -0.24 
(TC/R)
2
*Share -272.7659 -5.29  89.86727 1.25 
Cons -45.22331 -6.44  1.565658 0.26 
 
AdjR
2
 = 0.317  N = 4680 AdjR
2
 = 0.357 
Slope and intercept industry dummies not reported. 
 
 
Table 12 
Transaction cost impacts on profitability 
 
  Half normal Exponential 
Monotonic +ve 10 industries 4 industries 
Monotonic -ve 5 industries 8 industries 
Inverted U  2 industries 
U 1 industry 2 industries 
Notes 
Calculations based on regression results in table 11. 
The quadratic effects are measured over an assumed relevant range of TC/R < 1. 
Table 13 
Transaction cost impacts on profitability: industry characteristics 
 
  N  
 
1/H π/L Rev 
Gr 
TC/R 
TC half normal Positive 8 22.15 2.06 1.06 0.32 
 Negative 7 32.03 4.03 1.16 0.43 
       
TC exponential Positive 6 15.43 2.25 1.06 0.23 
 Negative 9 38.18 2.48 1.14 0.26 
 
Data taken from results reported in tables 5 and 6. 
Number of industries sum to 15 because of the non-monotonic result in one industry 
as reported in table 6. 
Values for 1/H, π/L, RevGr and TC/R are median values for the industries in each 
category taken from table 1. 
